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1Chapter 7
2Neuromyths for Educational Research
3and the Educational Field?
4Paul Smeyers
57.1 Neuroscience
6 AU1There is a new hype in educational research: it is called educational neuroscience or
7even neuroeducation (and neuroethics)—there are numerous publications, special
8journals, and an abundance of research projects together with the advertisement of
9many positions at renown research centres worldwide. An interesting starting point
10to see the gist of what is argued for is offered by a number of position papers
11published in a special issue1 of one of the philosophy of education journals
To identify relevant publications I started from a bibliographical search in the Philosopher’s Index
and the Social Sciences Citation Index (July 2014) and used as keywords neuroscience and
education.
1The special issue (Patten and Campbell 2011) contains the following contributions: Introduction:
Educational Neuroscience (pages 1–6), by Kathryn E. Patten and Stephen R. Campbell; Educa
tional Neuroscience: Motivations, methodology, and implications (pages 7–16) by Stephen
R. Campbell; Can Cognitive Neuroscience Ground a Science of Learning? (pages 17–23) by
Anthony E. Kelly; A Multiperspective Approach to Neuroeducational Research (pages 24–30) by
Paul A. Howard-Jones; What Can Neuroscience Bring to Education? (pages 31–36) by Michel
Ferrari; Connecting Education and Cognitive Neuroscience: Where will the journey take us?
(pages 37–42) by Daniel Ansari, Donna Coch and Bert De Smedt; Position Statement on Motiva
tions, Methodologies, and Practical Implications of Educational Neuroscience Research: fMRI
studies of the neural correlates of creative intelligence (pages 43–47) by John Geake; Brain-
Science Based Cohort Studies (pages 48–55) by Hideaki Koizumi; Directions for Mind, Brain, and
Education: Methods, Models, and Morality (pages 56–66) by Zachary Stein and Kurt W. Fischer;
The Birth of a Field and the Rebirth of the Laboratory School by Marc Schwartz and Jeanne
Gerlach; Mathematics Education and Neurosciences: Towards interdisciplinary insights into the
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12 (Educational Philosophy and Theory). Incidentally, the contributors are not phi-
13 losophers of education, but researchers working in the area of neuroscience. The
14 guest editors identify as a common aim of educational neuroscience “to produce
15 results that ultimately improve teaching and learning, in theory and in practice”
16 (Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 6). I hasten to add that the articles are full of
17 warnings, for example not to misapply science to education, that filling the gulf
18 between current science and direct classroom application is premature, and insist
19 not to exaggerate what this area could mean for education, thus to work in close
20 collaboration with . . .. Yet almost all are also expressing the hope (and the
21 confidence) that a lot may be expected from this, called by some, an emerging
22 subdiscipline. Here are some typical quotes from these papers.
23 The ‘holy grail’, for a transdisciplinary educational neuroscience as I see it, would be to
24 empower learners through the volitional application of minds to consciously perceive and
25 alter their own brain processes into states more conducive to various aspects of learning.
26 (Campbell in Patten and Campbell 2011, pp. 8–9).
27 The question is not whether there are connections between minds and brains. There
28 clearly are. The evidence is insurmountable and growing. The question then is to what
29 extent, subject to intrinsic theoretical and practical limits of measurement and analysis, can
30 we identify changes in mental states as changes in brain and brain behaviour, and vice
31 versa. (Campbell in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 11)
32 Working in the area of mathematics education Stephen Campbell, who has a
33 particular interest in the nature of mathematics anxiety and mathematical concept
34 formation (for example in ways in which the former impedes the latter), outlines
35 that he has in his educational neuroscience laboratory (the ENGRAMMETRON,2
36 Faculty of Education at Simon Fraser University) equipment to record
37 electroencephalograms (EEG), electrocardiograms (EKG), electro-oculograms (EOG), and
38 electromylograms (EMG), which pertain to brain activity, heart rate, eye movement and
39 muscle movement. . . . All these psychophysiological metrics are augmented with
40 eye-tracking technology, screen capture, keyboard and mouse capture, and multiple video
41 recordings of participants from various perspectives. These data sets can then be integrated
42 and synchronized for coding, analysis, and interpretation, thereby affording comprehensive
43 observations and insights into the learning process. (Campbell in Patten and Campbell
44 2011, p. 13)
development of young children’s mathematical abilities (pages 75–80) by Fenna Van Nes;
Neuroscience and the Teaching by Kerry Lee and Swee Fong Ng; The Somatic Appraisal
Model of Affect by Kathryn E. Patten; Implications of Affective and Social Neuroscience by
Mary Helen Immordino-Yang.
2 See http://www.engrammetron.net/about.html (retrieved October 22 2013)
“ENGRAMMETRON facilities enable simultaneous observation and acquisition of audio data
from talking-aloud reflective protocols; video data of facial and bodily expression; and real-time
screen capture. Instrumentation most notably supports: multi-channel electroencephalography
(EEG); electrocardiography (EKG); electromyography (EMG); and eye-tracking
(ET) capability. Orbiting this constellation of observational methods around computer enhanced
learning platforms allows for unprecedented flexibility of educational research experimental
design and delivery, and for subsequent data integration and analyses.”
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45According to Campbell:
46The main challenge has been to muster evidence and rationale to justify this initiative to
47funding agencies traditionally supporting educational research. (Campbell in Patten and
48Campbell 2011, p. 14)
49In the same issue Howard-Jones refers to an OECD Brain and Learning project
50and to the UK’s NeuroEducational research network at the University of Bristol
51(NEnet, www.neuroeducational.net). He argues in favour of a multiperspective
52approach (from neuroscience and education) and refers for instance to work within
53NEnet, i.e., an fMRI study of creativity fostering strategies:
54This imaging study, which included a focus on the biological correlates of creativity, was
55useful in revealing how those parts of the brain associated with creative effort in a story
56telling task were further activated when unrelated stimulus words had to be included.
57Results provided some helpful indication, at the biological level of action, of the likely
58effectiveness of such strategies in the longer term. (Howard-Jones in Patten and Campbell
592011, p. 26)
60Similarly Ferrari (in Patten and Campbell 2011) argues:
61. . . unlike cognitive neuroscience—which aims to explain how the mind is embodied—
62educational neuroscience necessarily incorporates values that reflect the kind of citizen and
63the kind of society we aspire to create (p. 31) . . . What are the biological foundations of
64authentic and deep understanding? Of an appreciation of art and beauty? Or of compassion
65for those in need at home and around the world? All these concerns reflect different values
66that matter to particular communities and neuroscience could inform us about all of them.
67(Ferrari in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 35)
68As I said, the papers are full of warnings, for example Ansari, Coch & De Smedt
69(in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 41) write:
70. . . close inspection of these claims for a direct connection between particular ‘brain-based’
71tools and teaching approaches reveals very loose and often factually incorrect links . . . the
72direct application of neuroscience findings to the classroom has not been particularly
73fruitful (Ansari, Coch, & De Smedt in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 41)
74Nevertheless, they too remain ‘believers’ when they identify for example as a
75topic for research:
76How might non-invasive neuroimaging methods be used to measure the relative success of
77educational approaches? (Ansari, Coch & De Smedt in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 42)
78
79Let me offer a few characterizations of what is envisaged:
80Offering support (a neuronal ‘explanation’) for what is ‘known’:
81In a second study we compared activations associated with fluid and non-fluid analogizing
82with letters, numbers and geometric shapes. We found overlapping patterns of neuronal
83activation between fluid and non-fluid analogizing in all formats. These results suggest that
84analogizing is a basic cognitive process and therefore critical for successful school perfor-
85mance. We also found in frontal cortical working memory areas modest correlations
86between non-fluid analogizing, but not fluid analogizing, and general IQ test scores,
87suggesting that conventional IQ tests, not to mention school assessments, might not capture
88abilities of fluid analogizing which underpin creative thinking. Teachers have long
89suspected that IQ tests, although predictive of academic success, do not reveal all there is
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90 about a child’s cognitive potential. Our findings, in supporting conjectures that the brain
91 might develop separate working memory systems for general intelligence and fluid cogni-
92 tion offer an explanation of such skepticism. (Geake in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 46)
93
94 7.2 Use a Way to Identify Brain Activity
95 Lee & NG (in Patten and Campbell 2011) report on investigations in their labora-
96 tory concerning heuristics commonly used for example to teach algebraic word
97 problems (respectively the model method and symbolic algebra).
98 In our laboratory, we conducted two studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
99 (fMRI) and focused on the cognitive underpinnings of the two methods. . . . All participants
100 in our study were pretested for competency in the two methods: we selected only those who
101 were highly and similarly competent. Ensuring behavioural equivalence allowed us to infer
102 differences in neural activation in terms of processes involved in executing the two methods
103 rather than differences in task difficulty. Despite the lack of behavioural differences, we
104 found difference in the degree to which the two methods activated areas associated with
105 attentional and working memory processes. In particular, transforming word problems into
106 algebraic representation required greater access to attentional processes than did transfor-
107 mation into models. Furthermore, symbolic algebra activated the caudate, which has been
108 associated with activation of proceduralised information. . . . Findings . . . suggest that . . .
109 Both methods activate similar brain areas, but symbolic algebra imposes more demands on
110 attentional resources. . . . If symbolic algebra is indeed more demanding on attentional
111 resources, one curricular implication is that it is best to teach the model method at the
112 primary level and leave symbolic algebra until students are more cognitively matured. (Lee
113 & Ng in Patten and Campbell 2011, pp. 83–84)
114 Another example is the research by Koizumi:
115 Although acquisition of a second language from early childhood is not undesirable, our
116 main concern is whether it has negative effects on the normal course of language develop-
117 ment in one’s native tongue. At present, there is no scientific data available on the
118 relationship between language acquisition (both the first and second) and brain maturation.
119 (Koizumi in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 51)
120 7.3 Labelling ‘Standard’ Educational Research
121 as ‘Neuroscience’ or ‘Bolster Your Case’ by Invoking
122 ‘Science’
123 There are for example the cohort studies on language acquisition, brain develop-
124 ment and language education (Hagiwara, Tokyo Metropolitan University).
125 Although their objectives to propose a guideline for second language learning and
126 education, especially for English, including the optimal ages and conditions sur-
127 rounding it, is very interesting, they phrase this as ‘a cognitive neuroscience-based
128 guideline’.
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1297.4 Bring Frameworks Together
130In most of these papers it is argued that bringing together frameworks respectively
131from educational research and from neuroscience will offer opportunities to deepen
132our understanding:
133The driving force behind bridging mathematics education and neuro-sciences in this project
134is the prospect of combining knowledge from both research trajectories to contribute to
135early diagnostic practice and prevention. If we succeed in developing and comparing two
136valid measures for the development of kindergartner’s mathematical ability, we may help to
137foster young children’s early mathematical insights and to stimulate those children who
138could be prone to experiencing difficulties in their mathematical development. The earlier
139we may grasp children’s mathematical learning trajectories, the more we can anticipate and
140furnish a supportive instructional setting, and the more we may be able to support the
141children in the development of their mathematical thinking and learning. (Van Nes in
142Patten and Campbell, p. 79).
143In a similar voice Tommerdahl (2010), writes:
144The paper supports the idea that the neurosciences have a role to play in education, but
145emphasises the distance and the complex relationships that exist between the brain sciences
146and proven teaching methods ready for the classroom. It is highly doubtful that any single
147given study in neurology will have a direct application to the classroom but, on a more
148hopeful note, it is almost certain that aggregations of findings from several studies,
149mediated through higher levels culminating in the behavioural and educational levels will
150indeed provide new teaching methodologies. (Tommerdahl 2010, p. 98).
151She presents a model:
152Five basic levels are offered in the model, the levels of neuroscience, cognitive neurosci-
153ence, psychological mechanisms, educational theory, and finally the classroom. For effec-
154tive teaching methods which are based on neuroscientific findings and which are supported
155by a scientific evidence base, most or all of these levels of work, and possibly more in some
156cases, are necessary to their development. (Tommerdahl 2010, p. 99).
157further she argues that:
158. . . the separation between the terms brain and mind could perhaps more appropriately be
159seen as different perspectives of the same thing, much like the famous figure/ground images
160where a viewer can see either an old lady with a large nose or a young women’s profile.
161(Tommerdahl 2010, p. 101)
162Examples of this are:
163In the field of bilingualism, brain scanning has shown there is a difference between
164bilinguals who learn a second language before age five and those who learn a second
165language at a later age. The first group processes their two languages in overlapping left
166hemisphere language centres while the second group calls more upon right hemisphere
167zones, working memory and inhibition areas when using their second language . . . In
168mathematics fMRI [is used] to distinguish whether precise mathematical calculations and
169numerical estimations used identical or distinct brain areas. A dissociation was shown to
170exist which also allowed the researchers to postulate that linguistic systems were likely to
171be mediating the precise calculations while visual centres were implicated in the approx-
172imations. (Tommerdahl 2010, p. 106)
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173 Similarly, Hardiman e.a. claim that
174 Although applying research from the neuro- and cognitive sciences to classroom practice
175 certainly remains a challenge, interdisciplinary collaboration has yielded considerable
176 educationally-relevant information about learning mechanisms that could not have been
177 acquired solely through behavioural methods. (Hardiman e.a., 2012, p. 137)
178 7.5 Finally, “The Sky Is the Limit”
179 Since the emergence of dispositions and basic emotions are to a large degree autonomic and
180 unconscious, they cannot be recognized nor stopped until they become conscious feelings.
181 However, they can be attenuated and avoided in the future through emotion regulation by
182 recognizing their emergence triggers and enacting preventive measured related to specific
183 object and situations. . . . This model [Somatic Appraisal Model of Affect] identifies
184 quintessential functions, components, and facets of affect necessary to provide a new
185 research domain, namely educational neuroscience, with a basis on which to build a
186 dynamic model of affect serving to challenge current pedagogy and inform and build a
187 new praxis, called neuropedagogy. (Patten in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 94)
188 Thus far some aspects of the ‘emerging field’. It is time to make a few observa-
189 tions and comments.
190 1. Tools that are used:
191 PET scan (Positron Emission Tomography): a radioactive isotope is injected which allows
192 the amount of glucose being metabolised in the brain to become visible (indicative of the
193 amount of blood in each part of the brain which in turn represents brain activity); provides
194 an image of the working brain; disadvantages: the need for radioactive material, the high
195 cost of use;
196 fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging): measures blood flow in the brain;
197 provides an image of the working brain;
198 EEG (electroencephalogram) shows cortical activity of the cortex in the form of
199 electrical signals directly harvested from groups of thousands of neurons through electrodes
200 placed on the scalp; no images of the brain, but instead detailed information about the time
201 course of neural activity and indications of where brain activity is being carried out;
202 MEG (magnetoencephalogram) measures the magnetic field outside the brain caused by
203 electrical activity; no images of the brain, but instead detailed information about the time
204 course of neural activity and indications of where brain activity is being carried out.
205 2. The studies are correlational. It is often assumed that for instance fMRI tech-
206 niques offer ‘visual proof’ of brain activity. However, as Narvaez and Vaydich
207 argue, few studies test theories and most are primarily correlational.
208 Far too often readers assume that fMRI techniques enable researchers to capture ‘visual
209 proof’ of brain activity, without taking into account the complexities of acquiring the data
210 and processing the images. To ease the task of interpreting and reporting results, neuroim-
211 aging studies often highlight responses in specific brain regions; however, these regions are
212 rarely the only ones that produced activity. Moreover, every human brain is distinctive, so
213 the fMRI studies look at areas of agreement across brains, which often vary greatly. In fact,
214 laboratories often use their own techniques to test and analyse the messy and inconsistent
215 data across participants and trials. Due to limited knowledge, few studies test theories and
216 most are primarily correlational. Moreover, correlative approaches, such as human brain
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217imaging and psychophysiology, are not sufficiently robust to adjudicate what is ‘basic
218about basic emotions’ because ‘autonomic physiology is regulated by generalized sympa-
219thetic and parasympathetic controls’ which are not measurable through fMRI. Activation
220can vary for a range of reasons. (Narvaez and Vaydich 2008, p. 291)
221Though aware of this, often nevertheless a particular conclusion is drawn in
222terms of the kind of research we need (granted, it comes with a warning as well):
223Given the current state-of-the-art in brain imaging, most neuroimaging data are correla-
224tional and do not provide information about causation. As in all scientific enquiry, there-
225fore, experimental design is crucial to how useful the data will be for contributing to
226research questions. For example, it is important to control for other factors that might be
227important for any correlations that are found, and to use control groups. . . . When
228evaluating neuroscience research, it is important to be vigilant: correlations are still
229correlations, even when they involve physiological measures. Yet many correlational
230findings that reach the popular media are given causal interpretations. (Goswami 2008,
231p. 386)
2323. Several philosophers have pointed to problems with the nature of the concepts
233that are used: for example they speak of a reductionism, or of a confusion of
234‘activity’ and ‘content’. Reference is made to Wittgenstein’s position concerning
235the ‘inner’, and to Ryle’s notion of ‘category mistake’, moreover to the issue of
236‘underdetermination’.
237Purdy & Morrison refer to a remark from Ter Hark “measuring pain with a
238thermometer is to change the very concept of pain, since the uncertainty of the
239psychological attribute of pain cannot be reduced (Purdy and Morrison 2009,
240p. 104).
241They also refer to Bennett and Hacker (2003) who, following the work of the
242later Wittgenstein, have asked whether we know ‘what it is for a brain to see or
243hear, for a brain to have experiences, to know or to believe something’. That the
244brain thinks, believes, etc. is for them the result of a conceptual confusion. Thus
245they point to the separation of the inner and the outer
246a ‘mutant form of Cartesianism’ where psychological attributes once ascribed to the mind,
247Descartes’ immaterial res cogitans, are now ascribed unreflectively to the material brain
248instead (Purdy and Morrison 2009, pp. 105–106).
249For them, the brain is not a logically appropriate subject for psychological
250attributes (the expression ‘the brain sees’ lacks sense, Bennett and Hacker
251refer to this as a case of explanatory reductivism).
252Bennett and Hacker (2003) conclude by maintaining that it makes no sense to attribute
253psychological attributes to either the mind (Cartesianism) or to the brain (cognitive
254neuroscience). Instead psychological attributes must be ascribed to the whole person
255‘who is a psychophysical unity, not a duality of two conjoined substances, a mind and a
256body’ (p. 106). Far from discrediting neuroscientific research, Bennett and Hacker simply
257argue that neuroscientists are often guilty of conceptual confusion in ascribing psycholog-
258ical attributes to the physical organ of the brain. (Purdy and Morrison 2009, pp. 105–106).
259Purdy and Morrison (2009, p. 108) conclude therefore:
260While neuroscience can reveal what is happening in the brain . . . the imagery is never more
261than a neural concomitant of that thinking. . .
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262 Obviously, though nothing prevents scientists from using psychological
263 expressions metaphorically, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists typically
264 presuppose that they are using psychological expressions literally.
265 A corollary to this is the dependence of technical concepts on ordinary
266 psychological concepts (which are not concepts of theoretical entities). Here
267 the argument runs as follows: without our ordinary concepts the technical
268 concepts from neuroscience would lack meaning. Moreover, though our ordi-
269 nary concepts are interrelated by way of implication, compatibility and incom-
270 patibility this does not imply that these are theoretical (see Chap. 13, Bennett and
271 Hacker 2003). For Bennett and Hacker therefore, neuroscience though it can
272 contribute to the explanation of irrational action and forms of incapacitation, it
273 cannot explain normal human behaviour (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 365).
274 A further step is the use of neuroscience concepts in the area of learning and
275 education. Davis (2004)) discusses brain-based learning and points to articles
276 presenting attempts to run together ideas about connectionism in the brain with
277 ‘connectionism’ at the level of knowledge and learning. There, two types of
278 connections are systematically conflated he argues: connections of a neurophys-
279 iological character that obtain in the brain during learning one the one hand, and
280 connections made by learners between ‘new’ knowledge and resident knowledge
281 on the other hand (Davis 2004, p. 25).
282 4. Unless the neurological mechanism that lies behind (and which is made
283 explicit) could be directly influenced, it is not clear what the educational
284 implications are which surpass those already available on the basis of relevant
285 research in for example educational psychology. That neuroscience offers a
286 description (or even explanation) in terms of neurological concepts and theo-
287 ries does not in itself warrant an educational surplus value. This remains to be
288 argued and established. It is possible that the techniques, methods, concepts
289 and theories of psychology will be replaced by those of neuroscience, in which
290 case there could be some gain in our understanding of learning. This pre-
291 supposes, however, accepting that the object of study of psychology coincides
292 with that studied by neuroscience. And as dealt with in the previous point, this
293 is doubtful.
294 Incidentally, responding to Schrag (2013), who asserts confidently that talk of
295 brain lesions being mere concomitants of an inability to recognize faces, Davis
296 (2013)) claims that this is too modest, i.e., the relevant neural states of affairs
297 play a causal role in causing the inability (Davis 2013, p. 35). However, and
298 interestingly, he draws attention to the direction of causality: “the very fact that
299 certain patients stopped recognizing faces set in motion events that had specific
300 effects on their brains . . . Such effects might have included the consequence that
301 parts of the brain became ‘atrophied’ because they were not being used” (Davis
302 2013, p. 35) This matter is certainly along the lines of something Aldrich draws
303 attention to:
304 brain structures are changed and adapted with each human activity. For example, in 2000
305 Eleanor Maguire examined the brains of 16 London taxi drivers via an fMRI scanner and
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306found that the part of the brain responsible for spatial navigation, the right posterior
307hippocampus, was 7% larger than normal, a significant difference. (Aldrich 2013, p. 397)
3085. Concerning what is frequently argued for, i.e. ‘bringing frameworks together’, if
309this is supposed to be more than the expression of what is always true, it needs to
310be shown in what way this is helpful. What is argued for is only true if one of
311these provides information for example at an earlier time than the other one.
312There are examples of this, but they are scarce. Goswani argues along these lines
313and provides such an example: neural variables can be used to identify those who
314might be at educational risk. (“. . . a child may be at risk because aspects of
315sensory processing are impaired, and biomarkers could show the presence of the
316processing impairment before any behavioural symptoms have appeared.”,
317Goswami 2008, pp. 394–395).
318That complementary information is gathered and the outcomes interpreted
319against two different backgrounds (one predominantly using a quantitative
320approach and an experimental setting,3 the other qualitative data from a
321classroom-based ‘design research’) is not enough. Except for very specific
322cases, the gains of such an approach, i.e., ‘bringing frameworks together’
323therefore remains doubtful.4
3246. And then there is the further step to ‘education’, as implicit in for instance the
325idea that improved knowledge about how the brain learns should assist educators
326in creating optimal learning conditions—not to mention issues concerning
327desirable outcomes, in general educational content and processes. Some scholars
328realise that the possible contribution is limited:
329In relation to education the indeterminacy of psychological attributes (such as under-
330standing) is not removed by a computer-generated print-out of neural processing, because
331this form of measurement creates a quite different concept. . . . Cognitive neuroscience
332may offer detailed pictures of neural networks, but, just as a thermometer fails to measure
333pain, so a brain scan fails logically to measure understanding: the concepts involved are
334simply different and the indeterminacy remains. Cognitive neuroscience therefore at best
335offers insights into the neural concomitants of thinking, but it offers no privileged access
336into the hidden world of the inner, that inner world being already manifest in external
337behaviour. Rather than representing a panacea to education, the cognitive neuroscientific
3 “Before the trials begin, the researcher fits a cap on the child’s head with electrodes that register
brain activity. This non-invasive EEG technique informs the researcher about the onset and
duration of brain signals for particular stimuli and motor and perceptual responses. ANOVAs
help determine differences in the brain activation and in the reaction times and additional analyses
give more insight into the nature of interference and facilitation effects in the different experi-
mental conditions.” (Van Nes in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 78)
4 Some authors remain nevertheless confident of such an approach: “With one research discipline
set in a classroom environment and another that is based on a laboratory setting, the collaboration
between the ME [Mathematics education component] and NS [Neurosciences component]
research rests on studying the same children. The children who participate in the ME research
are part of the larger pool of children who will also participate in the NAS research. In this way we
hope to be able to compare children’s phase of spatial structuring with the degree to which they
automatically process quantities.” (Van Nes in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 78)
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338 enterprise in relation to education is therefore necessarily limited. (Purdy and Morrison
339 2009, p. 105)
340 Others seem to be inclined to forget, and proclaim the need for such an approach:
341 Cognitive neuroscience is important for education because it enables a principled under-
342 standing of the mechanisms of learning and of the basic components of human perfor-
343 mance. It also enables componential understanding of the complex cognitive skills taught
344 by education. Many of the principles of leaning uncovered by cognitive neuroscience might
345 appear to support what teachers knew already. For example, aspects of pedagogy such as
346 the value of multi-sensory teaching approaches or of crating safe and secure environments
347 for learning are highly familiar. Nevertheless, cognitive neuroscience offers an empirical
348 foundation for supporting certain insights already present in pedagogy and disputing others.
349 The evidence from neuroscience is not just interesting scientifically. It enables an evidence
350 base for education in which mechanisms of learning can be precisely understood.
351 (Goswami 2008, p. 396)
352 7.6 Some Conclusions
353 For various reasons educational research has been eager to adopt psychology’s
354 methodology (paradigm and methods) and has embraced causality/probability with
355 the predictability and the possible elements of manipulation that go with it (see
356 Smeyers and Depaepe 2013). What has been argued for in general for psychology is
357 no less true for the attraction of neuroscience. But before saying more about that, I
358 will first deal with the crucial issue of what it is exactly that concepts of neurosci-
359 ence can refer to.
360 What goes missing in any third-personal, physical description of brain states is,
361 Bakhurst (2008) argues, the subjective dimension: “. . .all that is observable are the
362 neural correlates of mental activity, not mental activity itself” (p. 422). To this he
363 adds that from a personalist position, beginning from the premise that the human
364 mind is a psychological unity, a person’s mental states are not just a rag-bag
365 collection of representations. “One way to put this argument about psychological
366 unity is to say that brainism [the view (a) that an individual’s mental life is
367 constituted by states, events and processes in her brain, and (b) that psychological
368 attributes may legitimately be ascribed to the brain, p. 415] struggles to make sense
369 of the first-person perspective. A person does not typically stand to her own mental
370 states as to objects of observation” (p. 422). Our observing is always charged with
371 agency: “But although a person does not relate to the contents of her mind as to
372 objects of observation, her relation to her own brain states, as revealed, say, by MRI
373 imaging, is one of observation. Thus what she observes when she observes events in
374 her own brain can only be brain events correlated with, and enabling of, her mental
375 life, not her mental life itself” (p. 423) To this personalism and following McDow-
376 ell, he adds a distinctive view of human development: “As the child matures,
377 however, she undergoes a qualitative transformation. She enters a distinctively
378 human, essentially social form of life and acquires distinctively human
80 P. Smeyers
379psychological capacities that enable her to transcend existence in the narrow
380confines of a biological environment and to hold the world in view. With this,
381natural-scientific modes of explanation are no longer adequate to explain the
382character of the child’s mindedness” (Bakhurst 2008, p. 423). And he continues:
383“The human mind constantly transcends its own limits; it does not simply apply old
384techniques to new problems. On the contrary, we set ourselves problems precisely
385to develop the methods to address them, a process that in turn uncovers new
386questions, creating new problem-spaces demanding further innovation and so
387on. To understand this dialectical process, we cannot represent the mind as deter-
388mined by antecedent conditions” (Bakhurst 2008, pp. 423–424). Instead, as
389McDowell argues, human beings think and act, Bakhurst argues, in the light of
390reasons: “The relations in which rational explanation deals are normative in char-
391acter. When I decide that Jack must believe that q because he believes (a) that p and
392(b) that p entails q, I am not making a causal claim. I am assuming that Jack believes
393what he ought to believe if he is rational” (Bakhurst 2008, p. 424). These sort of
394relations are not the sort of relations that are characterised by natural-scientific
395theories, they are different from what goes on in the brain which is exhaustively
396open to scientific explanation; mental states and processes occupy a different
397logical space—the space of reasons. Human beings inhabit a social world because
398their world is full of objects created by human beings for human purposes. For him
399psychological talk represents a fundamentally different discourse from talk of the
400brain. Obviously, brain science can illuminate learning in the explanation of
401dysfunction, deficit and disorder, he argues (a matter often referred to in the
402literature, see for example, Davis 2004, p. 22): “Once we adopt the causal perspec-
403tive on the child’s problems, we cease to see her as a rational agent, at least in this
404respect, and absolve her from responsibility, and hence blame, for her failings”
405(Bakhurst 2008, p. 426). According to Bakhurst brain science can moreover
406illuminate why someone is especially good at some practice (he refers to speed of
407thought as an example of causal preconditions of rational powers). Thus he con-
408cludes that as there is as much reason to avoid crass biological determinism as there
409is to eschew a priori nurturism, there “are no a priori grounds to declare brain
410science irrelevant to educational issues, or relevant only in ‘deficit’ cases”
411(Bakhurst 2008, p. 428); “What is critical, however, is that interest in the brain
412should not distract attention from the fact that education is a communicative
413endeavour, not an engineering problem. Education is not about getting information
414into students’ heads or of implanting skills in them” . . . Once again, information
415and skills are not all that is at issue. Machines may possess those, or close
416surrogates, but machines have no practices and crafts (Bakhurst 2008, p. 428).
417If Bakhurst’s position carries weight, it is doubtful that a lot may be expected
418from what is frequently argued for in the neuroscience subdiscipline, i.e., ‘combin-
419ing frameworks’. Do they make a mountain out of a molehill? The so-called
420frameworks that have to be brought together are fundamentally different. More-
421over, there is something strange going on in the debate about neuroscience and
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422 education: the methods that are used are correlational, i.e. the tools measure
423 indirectly brain activity, there is conceptual confusion in more than one sense,5
424 and yet the proponents do not stop to argue that a lot can be expected from such an
425 approach.
426 This is not to say that in some cases indeed relevant insights for education can be
427 offered. Here are two examples given in a study by Sigman, Pe~na, Goldin, Riberio:
428 Neuroscience research has developed signatures that may serve to diagnose cognitive
429 impairments potentially earlier than would be conceivable by behavioural or psychological
430 inspection. A paradigmatic example is the detection of otoacoustic emissions in neonates, a
431 tool that helps identify congenital deafness. Traditional detection by psychological tests can
432 only be made months after birth, missing a window of opportunity for early interventions.
433 (Sigman e.a., 2014, p. 498)
434 The diagnosis of dyslexia is typically made in children aged 7–8 years old, when
435 population variability in reading scores becomes evident. However, interventions to reme-
436 diate dyslexia are much more likely to be successful when conducted on children who are
437 beginning to read or even before reading if they are based exclusively on improving
438 auditory processing. As with many other medical conditions, early diagnosis is a funda-
439 mental aspect of remediation. The development of neurophysiological markers of later
440 dyslexic developments are therefore of great practical relevance. . . . the . . . study . . . found
441 that, as early as birth, infants with and without familial risk for dyslexia differ in ERPs
442 [event-related potentials] to linguistic stimuli. . . . Taken together, these studies indicate that
443 ERPs measured during infancy might help to screen for problems in reading-related skills,
444 serving as an indicator or risk of impaired auditory/speech processing. (Sigman, e.a., 2014,
445 p. 500)
446 Francis Schrag (2011)) offers a more subtle position when dealing with the
447 possible contribution of neuroscience. He too starts from the validity neuroscience
448 at first sight may have as it “discovers more and more about the mechanisms of
449 learning and memory” (pp. 222–223) but claims that “From the teachers’ point of
450 view, knowing which brain structures are involved adds nothing to the success of
451 the strategies” (ibid., p. 226). He envisions that the ongoing research which is
452 offered by cognitive neuroscientists is “. . . yielding continued progress in under-
453 standing neural processes at the micro level, an understanding that will be translated
454 into interventions designed to affect micro level processes in order to reduce
455 cognitive deficits and enhance performance at the macro level” (ibid., p. 236).
456 Strangely enough, he is not convinced that we need philosophers “. . .to tamp down
457 the enthusiasm of neuroscientists who may be all too ready to launch bandwagons
5 “Psychological predicates are predicates that apply essentially to the whole living animal, not to
its parts. It is not the eye (let alone the brain) that sees, but we see with our eyes (and we do not see
with our brains, although without a brain functioning normally in respect of the visual system, we
would not see). So, too, it is not the ear that hears, but the animal whose ear it is. The organs of an
animal are part of the animal, and psychological predicates are ascribable to the whole animal, not
its constituent parts. Mereology is the logic of part/whole relations.” (Bennett and Hacker 2003,
pp. 72–73). Bennett & Hacker term the neuroscientist’s ascription of psychological attributes to
the brain ‘the mereological fallacy’ in neuroscience. They also point to what the neuroscientist is
seeing: “What one sees on the scan is not the brain thinking. . . nor the person thinking . . . but the
computer-generated image of the excitement of cells in his brain that occurs when he is thinking.”
(Bennett and Hacker 2003, pp. 83–84)
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458declaring that their research will show the way to the holy grail of educational
459transformation? The answer here is clear: we do not. In fact those at the new frontier
460are very aware of the limitations of their work and of the propensity of less skilled
461disciples to mislead the rust of us” (ibid., p. 228). This may be the case for some, in
462general I do not think that this is a truthful picture of what the educational
463researchers working in this area aspire to. Here are some examples:
464In the introduction to a special issue of the International Journal of Science and
465Mathematics Education (2014, 3) Anderson, Love & Tsai write:
466Perspectives on possible future approaches and challenges in reaching the goals of a
467neuroeducational theory are presented, including applying new techniques such as
468eye-tracking. EEG, and fMRI analyses to further understand individual differences in
469student brain functions while performing some typical cognitive functions in math and
470science learning, such as problem solving, self-directed learning, and interaction with
471digital-based learning environments. (p. 468)
472And introducing the article by Liu Chang in that issue they say that these authors
473“. . .offer science educations some neuroscience-backed information as a founda-
474tion to develop results-oriented curricula and teaching methods” (Anderson
475et al. 2014, p. 471). And his own article in the special issue Anderson writes:
476“The opportunity for merging neurosciences with modern digital technology design
477theory and best delivery practices is clearly significant and likely to be highly
478productive in advancing the efficacy of these learning environments” (Anderson,
4792014, p. 476). Of course, he starts from “There is much to be gained by beginning
480with an assumption that the human brain is a functional systemic unit (though
481modular based) in processing and responding to complex information” (ibid.,
482p. 482)—which embraces precisely what was criticized above (i.e., a confusion at
483the conceptual level). For him it is all very clear: “The more we understand the
484physiological bases for individual differences in learning, the more likely we can
485develop effective ways of maximizing the individual learning potentials of our
486students.” (ibid., p. 488). Others focus on what neuroscience insights can do for
487teachers, thus for example Hook & Farah argue in Neuroethics “Our evidence
488indicates that educators use neuroscience to maintain patience, optimism and
489professionalism with their students, to increase their credibility with colleagues
490and parents, and to reinforce their sense of education as a profession concerned with
491shaping students’ brain development. None of these motivations presupposes an
492unrealistic view of neuroscience or neuroeducation” (Hook and Farah 2013,
493pp. 339–340). And in the Educational Researcher Dubinsky, Roehrig & Varma
494argue that: “. . . teachers benefit from additionally understanding the neuroscience
495of learning and memory. . . .Neuroscience has the unique feature that it provides the
496neurobiological basis for learning, thus allowing discussions about student learning
497to occur within a scientific, psychological, and pedagogical context” (Dubinsky
498et al. 2013, p. 320). For these authors “Knowledge of the biological basis of
499learning and memory and the inherent plasticity of this intricate system gave
500teachers a more positive attitude towards each student’s ability to change and
501learn” (ibid., p. 324) and moreover “. . . teaching neuroscience to students can
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502 increase their self-understanding, self-efficacy, motivation and metacognition”
503 (ibid., p. 327).
504 Let me summarize: there are many problems with the un-qualified message or
505 promise of neuroscience related to educational research and the educational field,
506 first of all at the level of the concepts that are used (‘brain’ versus ‘mind’). Further,
507 though there may exist a correlation between some mental phenomena and neuro-
508 physiological states, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the phenom-
509 ena, what we need instead if one wants to pursue this line of research is an
510 explanation in terms of the mechanism (or mechanisms) that is/are at stake, in
511 other words a causal explanation. Harre´ and Tissaw (2005) distinguish first person
512 expressive talk (for example thinking, believing, happiness etc.) from third person
513 descriptive talk (for example brain activity) and label and categorize the distinction
514 between the grammar of first-person expressive talk and third-person descriptive
515 talk as the asymmetry principle. This is ignored when one speaks about and
516 localizes the former (psychological terms, intentional terms and sensations) ‘in
517 the brain’. Another way to identify what is happening may be called the transgres-
518 sion from the mentalist mind-body approach to the materialist brain-body approach.
519 Moreover, according to its own paradigm (means-end) clearly, there are hardly
520 studies which show educationally relevant effects (not to mention the
521 underdetermination problem). And finally, there are quite a few decisions (for
522 example ethical) educators have to take for which neuroscience cannot deliver
523 the necessary insights. All of this may lead to the conclusion that there is not a lot to
524 be expected from the so-called knowledge exchange between the disciplines of
525 education and neuroscience, i.e. if one accepts that there is a difference between on
526 the one hand causality/probability/contingency and freedom/choice/responsibility/
527 regret/remorse on the other hand. We should I think do away with talking about
528 ‘brain behaviour’ or consciously perceive and alter one’s own brain processes to
529 give just two examples; and perhaps also with mustering evidence and rationale of
530 neuroscience research to funding agencies traditionally supporting educational
531 research.
532 Clearly, neuroscientific explanations have a particular seductive character. Evi-
533 dence for this can be found in a 2008 article byWeisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson,
534 and Gray who discuss an experiment they have set up concerning the seductive
535 allure of neuroscience explanations. Explanations with logically irrelevant neuro-
536 science information had a particularly striking effect on non-expert’s judgments of
537 bad explanations. So why is it then that neuroscience is so attractive? Interestingly,
538 one may be tempted to find an answer in the discussion this field offers itself when
539 discussing certain so-called neuromyths of which examples are that one only uses a
540 fraction of one’s brain, namely 10%, or that people are rather right- or left-brained.
541 There is even a specific label coined for this: neurophilia (the appetite for neuro-
542 science). Pasquinelli (2012) discusses several issues of neuromyths (the miscon-
543 ceptions about the mind and brain functioning) such as the origin, persistence and
544 potential side-effects in education. There is according to her in the media “the
545 tendency to offer irrelevant information, sensationalism, and the omission of
546 relevant information” (Pasquinelli 2012, p. 90). She also refers to the biasing effect
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547of images: “because neuroimages appear as compelling as eyewitness, they are
548persuasive” (Pasquinelli 2012, p. 91). Thus she argues: “The ignorance of basic
549facts about the making–of of brain images can mislead the layperson into believing
550that an image of the brain is sufficient to prove the existence of a mental state—an
551attitude described as ‘neurorealism’” (Pasquinelli 2012, p. 91). And she refers to the
552blossoming of projects, reports and studies on the social, political, and educational
553implications of neuroscience, looking in the latter field for guidelines and/or easy
554fixes for education. She talks about the example of Brain Gym (based on the idea
555that when different parts of the brain do not work in coordination learning can be
556impaired), and argues that though there is no evidence that its exercises are
557effective, they are globally well received in the domain of education (Pasquinelli
5582012, p. 92). It is therefore really disappointing to find towards the end of the paper
559as an answer to the question what actions one can take, only that “knowledge must
560be pursued, conveniently disseminated, and taught” (Pasquinelli 2012, p. 93) end-
561ing with the mantra “From this collaboration [an effective interbreed between
562science and applicative domains (such as education)], compelling theories and
563practices can see the light that are at the same time true of science and meaningful
564for educators” (Pasquinelli 2012, p. 94).
565Granted, neuroscientific studies can eradicate mistaken views about how the
566brain works. But that does not go very far to justify a legitimate educational interest
567not to mention what needs to be done in educational contexts. It does not justify the
568direction a lot of educational research has taken, not to mention the amount of
569money that is made available. It may be a field that merits interest on its own
570strengths, surely there are so many areas which are interesting. But it should not be
571‘sold’ as highly relevant for education. Indeed, something very remarkable is going
572on there: never mind the possible problems, we are aware of that, so let’s continue
573‘business as usual’, and therefore the mantra sounds ‘a lot may be expected from
574this field!’ It is easy so see how educators may be tempted to find an easy fix for
575educational problems, overwhelmed by neurorealism and the aura of doing real
576science offering the prestige that goes with it and the so-called expertise demanded
577for by educators and no less by parents. My arguments have been directed against
578such a neuromyth, which I offer as a reminder that education, including educational
579research and the discipline of education, should reclaim its territory.
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